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From Crime to Punishment and Back: Lights of Comedy, Shades of 
Tragedy in The Merchant of Venice 
Nuno Pinto Ribeiro 
Oporto University/ C. E. T. U. P. 
 
 
 
1. The Taming of the Jew. 
If one wishes to explore a common ground in Justice, its structure 
and proceedings, and representation, its direction choices and devices, 
The Merchant of Venice may be seen as an obvious case in point. 
Elizabethan drama is pervaded by a structural dialogical configuration 
that joins performance and rhetoric, and the rival arguments of 
performed conflict suggest in limine distribution of alternative visions of 
issues under debate and consideration; to that extent, too, stage and 
court are kindred places, but when the trial scene has a deliberate role to 
play in the action of the play, the claims of both sides of a controversial 
disputation invite readers and audiences to assume the role and 
responsibility as judges. Law calls for enforcement in court, sometimes 
with the sense of balance required by the delicate elusive nature of the 
case, as when life and incorporeal personal property are at a stake and 
the production of a verdict becomes particularly a delicate job, and 
authority has many times to rely on the appropriate precedent case law; 
along similar lines, the text of the play only achieves its consummation 
on the stage, the site of its ultimate ‘application’, and its reading and 
understanding, always founded on the never-ending cross-fertilization of 
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page and stage, goes hand in hand with the authority of the long course 
of its spectacular expression. The Restoration and the Eighteenth 
Century didn’t hesitate in the drastic refashioning of works seen as the 
genial but crude product of a rough social and historical context, but in 
our time, ostensive creative and iconoclastic inflections to the received 
tradition excepted, the prevailing allegiance to textual form and meaning 
cannot ignore the disturbing displacement in personal responsiveness 
and social inclinations that separates us from the Elizabethan values, 
emotions and cultural references. Comic celebration and tragic 
reconciliation do not operate as firm categories – in Shakespeare and his 
fellow dramatists they never did, in spite of the reasonable functional 
tripartite division established in the First Folio of 1623 –Comedies, 
Histories, Tragedies -,and each play is, in many ways, a world of its own, 
as Stanley Wells stresses in the opening considerations of his General 
Introduction to each volume of the Penguin Shakespeare; this does not 
make it any easier for us to examine dramatic subgeneric denominations. 
What was for Elizabethans a source of laughter and pure entertainment 
may be for us a matter of embarassment. Henry V is certainly the 
glorious hero of Agincourt, the strict agent of an imperative justice in the 
field of war, but readers and audiences today are comfortably enough to 
be fond of him only in the distance in time; Hal and Poins may be very 
funny for the crowds of London used to the delights of violent 
entertainments and the bloody spectacles of public executions (such as 
the passion play of the capital punishment of Roderigo Lopez, the 
Portuguese physician of Elisabeth I accused of plotting against her 
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queen, an episode that certainly stimulated the Jewish theme on the 
English stage) but their tricks against the poor Francis in the tavern 
would not work out just as innocent practical jokes today. The Jew is a 
figure with a long tradition as a scapegoat, exorcised in carnivalesque 
celebrations, in popular festivities since the Middle Ages, and a priviled 
target of scorn and fury1. Sources of The Merchant of Venice generally 
accepted include the story by the Italian novelliere Ser Giovanni 
Fiorentino Il Pecorone (1558), paying homage to that tradition, and 
Christopher Marlowe’s savage farce The Jew of Malta (1593?) and its 
revivals, a relevant moment in this long story, may also have encouraged 
Shakespeare’s creation. The title page of the first version in print of the 
text lays stress on the Jew and his cruelty (Q1, printed in 1600, called it a 
‘history’ 2suggesting Shylock as the protagonist), and the uncertain 
bloody outcome of his revenge gratified the strongest populist emotions. 
Expectations seemed to give full vent to the image of the Jew as an ogre 
and the incarnation of the devil. The Merchant of Venice was to be The 
Taming of the Jew. To cancel or mitigate this uncomfortable feeling, 
scholars and readers have tried to see in the character a specific and 
unique figure rather than a type of ethnic or cultural impersonation, and 
performances, a testing site of apprehended consensual meanings, have 
tended to alleviate distressing suggestions in a redeeming operation that 
returns to the dramatist the acceptability of modern values and taste.  
                                                          
1See, inter alia,BRISTOL, Michael, Carnival and Theatre: Plebeian Culture of Authority in Renaissance England, 
New York and London, Routledge, 1985, p. 51. 
2 The most excelente/ Historie of the Merchant of Venice. / With the extreme crueltie of Shylock the Jew/ 
Toward the said Merchant, in cutting a iust pound/ of his flesh: and the obtaining of Portia/ by the choyce of 
three chests. / As it had beene divers times acted by the Lord/ Chamberlain his Servants. / Written by 
William Shakespeare, … Except when otherwise specified, textual quotings  refer to John Russell Brown 
edition (The Merchant of Venice, London, Methuen & Company, The Arden Shakespeare, 1976. 
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John Barton, in his experience as director, rules out any anti-
Semitic quality of the play. A long quoting summarizes the issues under 
consideration: 
 
Many people feel it´s deeply anti-Semitic and ought not to be performed. 
Others react the other way and say that, if you read the text aright, Shylock the 
Jew is intended by Shakespeare to be a sympathetic and even a heroic character. 
It’s often played like that, so you can take your choice. I have directed the play at 
different times with Patrick Stewart and with David Suchet. Each of them played 
Shylock though neither of them saw the other in the part. So we should all 
declare at the outset what we believe Shakespeare means us to feel about the 
character. We believe that he shows Shylock as a bad Jew and a bad human 
being, but that this in itself does not make the play anti-Semitic. If we thought to 
be so we would not have done it. Anti-Semitism is certainly expressed in the play 
by some of the characters, but of course that doesn’t mean that Shakespeare 
himself approves of what they are saying. They are two other Jews in the play, 
Shylock’s daughter, Jessica, and Tubal; Shakespeare doesn’t take any anti-Semitic 
view of them. But Shylock is a would-be murderer, who refuses to show any 
mercy to Antonio, the merchant and his intended victim. Those who try to justify 
Shylock have to work very hard to get round that, though they usually feel that 
they can do so’3.  
 
But there is no common belief even concerning this production of 
1981: Patrick Stuart emphazises the universal condition of the alien, the 
need to liberate the play from any limiting obsessive Jewishness and 
therefore to rescue Shylock from a mere symbolic status, since he is ‘an 
outsider who happens to be a Jew’, and David Suchet, a Jew himself, 
                                                          
3BARTON, John, ed. ,RSC in Playing Shakespeare, London and New York, Methuen in association with Channel 
Four Television Company, 1984, p. 169. 
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replies that ‘I would say that as Shylock I’m not an outsider who happens 
to be a Jew but because I’m a Jew. The Jewish element in the play is 
unavoidable and very important’4.Performances find the ways to stress 
the humanity and loneliness of the Jew among his enemies: the 
provocation of revellers wearing masks of pig’s heads and perhaps 
sausages on poles, in an outrageous act of sacrilege when Jessica 
renounces her father and the religion of her nation and her ancestors 
and elopes from Shylock’s house to join Lorenzo, conveniently provided 
with her father’s jewels and riches, in II. 6., Solanio’s joyfull report of the 
Jew’s disgrace with the shapes or noises of the vile crowd rejoicing in 
sadistic outburst in the background, in II. 8., the devastated man, 
dishevelled and with his clothes in disorder, mad and worn out in 
distress and suffering before the cynical conspirators, with a hostile 
crowd threatening him or even harassing and afflicting him,in III. 1., the 
scene that contains the famous speech ‘I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? 
Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? 
…’), or, in the same scene, the news from Jessica by messengers in cheer 
and bliss, or the promptness Jessica abandons his father and the zeal 
with which she exposes him before his new brethren in the faith5.And 
specially impressive for generations to come was the cry of anguish of 
Laurence Olivier’s Shylock (Jonathan Miller, National Theatre, 1970): 
after leaving the stage, this excruciating expression of pain of a man 
deprived of his spiritual life froze the members of the court, who kept 
                                                          
4Idem, ibidem, p.171. 
5 See notes to these passages in EDELMAN, Charles, ed. ,The Merchant of Venice, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, passim. 
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silent for some heavy unbearable moments. Prejudice and discrimination 
are not to be circumscribed to the active barbarous instinct of 
destruction given full vent, as depicted in recent European history: ‘…an 
anti-Semitic work of art as one that portrays Jews in a way that makes 
them objects of antipathy to readers and spectators – objects of scorn, 
hatred, laughter, or contempt’, is the definition put forward by Derek 
Cohen6, and I am not impressed by the historically established fact that 
members of the Jewish community in London at the time were not 
conspicuous or felt to be a heretic, political, moral or economic threat (by 
the way, Roderigo Lopez, was suppressed not because his religious or 
cultural nonconformity but for alleged treason involving the Spanish 
connection – and, perhaps, for the biased obstinate attitude of the Earl of 
Essex, a cornerstone of the rigged trial that in 1594 sentenced the 
Queen’s physician to death – this last note paving the way to some 
speculation concerning the trial in Act IV in The Merchant of Venice7). As 
a matter of fact, the circumspection of a small group without an audible 
voice, perhaps as alien and improbable as a daily presence as the 
sensational redskins in comics and Westerns a generation ago, made it 
appropriate for dramatists to lick the cake and have it: without much 
risk or fuss, the old scapegoat could be brought to the stage. The subject 
is obviously relevant to the reading and evaluation of the nature of the 
central trial scene in the play, and at this juncture one can say that David 
Suchet has a good point: ‘Shakespeare never lets the audience or the 
                                                          
6‘Shylock and the Idea of the Jew, in MARCUS, Leah S. , ed. , William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, New 
York and London, W. W. Norton & Company, A Norton Critical Edition, 2006, p. 194. 
7MOODY, A. D. ,Shakespeare: The Merchant of Venice, London, Edward Arnold, Studies in English Literature 21, 
1964, pp.18-19. 
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other characters forget the Jewish thing. You only have to look at the trial 
scene where he’s called ‘Shylock’ only six times but ‘Jew’ twenty-
two’8.The word ‘Jew’ is not dispassionate or neutral in the context of the 
play, and ‘the Jew’ as a recurrent address, especially when coupled with 
‘devil’ and ‘villain’, deprives the adressee of his human qualification and 
stresses his vulnerable condition of outsider and outcast to be.  
Intolerance and distrust mark the very beginning of the action. 
The thoughtful and melancholy Antonio, possessed with a mysterious 
despondency his jolly good fellows can only assign to the merchant’s 
anxiety that risks his fortune in so many ships on the capricious sea 
(‘ventures’, ‘merchandise’, ‘fortune’, and words and expressions of the 
same semantic area establish the cultural and economic matrix of the 
society depicted in the play), cannot find a partner among Christian 
traders to sponsor his dearest friend, Bassanio, in his quest of the golden 
fleece, the rich, fair and virtuous lady (by that order, in Bassanio´s 
speech, I. 1. 161-163)that waits in the fairy land of Belmont (the place of 
harmony and supposedly beyond the economic contingency of Venice 
seems, however, to work as an adamant of riches brought by the many 
Jasons in competition) for the Prince Charming that may make the right 
choice among three caskets, marry her and so release her from the bond 
imposed by her father. Shylock is a last resort, and mutual distaste and 
old grievances delineate a frame of reference that would made the 
contract a dubious prospect. The reasons of the creditor are based on 
                                                          
8BARTON, John, ibidem, p.171. 
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religion, hurt feelings of the member of a repressed community and 
resentment against economic practices that reject and damage usury:     
                                   
How like a fawning publican he looks. 
I hate him for he is a Christian; 
But more, for that in low simplicity 
He lends out Money gratis and brings down 
The rate of usance here with us in Venice. 
If I can catch him once upon the hip, 
I will feed fat the ancient grudge I bear him. 
He hates our sacred nation and he rails 
Even there where merchants most do congregate 
On me, my bargains, and my well-won thrift, 
Which he calls interest. Cursèd be my tribe 
If I forgive him.(I. 3. 38-49) 
 
Antonio, when reminded of past abuses (‘You call me misbeliever, 
cut-throat dog, / And spit upon my Jewish gaberdine, / …/ You spurned 
me…/You called me a dog, …), corroborates with conviction his fervent 
animosity (‘I am as like to call thee so again,/ To spit on thee again, to 
spurn thee too.’). No mercy when the essence of the enemy would make 
it a vain gesture (‘The devil can cite Scripture for his purpose’, the 
sponsor in the strange bond ‘in a merry sport’ had said, conjuring a 
formula of disquieting familiar evocations). For Launcelot Gobbo, 
Shylock is ‘a kind of devil’ (II. 2. 20), for Solanio he is ´the dog Jew’ (II. 8. 
14), for Jessica the house she is about to leave in secret is hell (II. 3. 2), 
and this abhorrence does not concern the ruthless Jew only (‘Here comes 
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another of the tribe. A third cannot be matched, unless the devil himself 
turn Jew’, remarks Salerio when Tubal enters, at III. 1. 70-71).  
 
2. The Quality of Mercy 
Outsiders have not an easy life in Venice. What would happen to a 
Jew found guilty of spurning and abusing a Christian? And Jessica, the 
shrewd unruly daughter that carries her father’s jewels in the night, 
seems not to deserve any kind of social disapproval (Christians rejoice in 
her success and timely elopement). Crime is not an objective deed in face 
of the law, and in the trial scene we will know that specific norms apply 
to outsiders. In the court of Venice drawbacks of justice are exposed with 
disarming irony. The dialogue between Antonio, the defendant, and the 
Duke, who is supposed to keep a strict imparciality in the session, lays 
bare the emotional involvement of the judge – 
 
I am sorry fot thee. Thou art come to answer 
A stony adversary, an inhuman wretch, 
Uncapable of pity, void and empt  
From any dram of mercy. 
 
-,  Shylock’s arrival is met with an act of sheer intimidation –‘Make 
room, and let him stand before our face.’ – and an exhortation which 
lacks any persuasive force. The ‘strange apparent cruelty’ of the 
complainant should give way to ‘human gentleness and love’ and to a 
‘gentle answer’. But the obstinate Jew has sworn by the holy Sabbath 
(the solemn rites and sinister practices in the synagogue are, according 
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to Cohen, an impressive sign of the anti-Semitic nature of the play), and 
he invokes his formal privileges granted in the bond (an extravagance 
that ostensibly jeopardizes non alienable and corporeal property). The 
court cannot disclaim jurisdiction power and has to respond to the 
challenge of a cause with the tried and true promise of impending 
shocking disaster. Antonio himself, under the burden of bankrupcy and 
misfortune, was well aware of the dictates of formal justice and the 
unassailable position of his enemy: 
 
The Duke cannot deny the course of law, 
For the commodity that strangers have 
With us in Venice, if it be denied, 
With much impeach the justice of the state, 
Since that the trade and profit of the city 
Consists of all nations. /…/(III. 3. 26-31). 
 
The unrelenting creditor is obsessed in carrying out his 
prerrogatives in court (‘I will have my bond’), and his reliance on the 
pragmatic duty of justice is certainly well founded. ‘He plies the Duke at 
morning and  night,/ And doth impeach the freedom of the state/ If they 
deny him justice, as Solanio reports, and later on he will overtly demand 
the literal fulfilment of his rights, no matter what the foreseeable 
consequences may be (‘If you deny me, fie upon your law!, IV. 1. 
101).And when the Duke is about to dismiss the court and provide the 
plaintiff full satisfaction, the deus ex machine arrives in the form of 
Balthasar, that is to say, Portia in the disguise of a ‘learned doctor’ from 
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Rome. The newcomer is supposed to be the forensic expert summoned 
to the court to the task of legal textual interpretation, but this 
expectation will soon be evaded by his surprising authority and assertive 
behaviour. ‘Which is the merchant here? And which the Jew?’ seems to 
go beyond a legal form of address simply devised to confirm identity of 
the real parties in interest, and since facts are proved, lawfulness of the 
petition and its penal clause established and jurisdiction power 
confirmed, a satisfactory outcome of the case would only prevail if 
Shylock were to show mercy to mitigate the justice of the play, as the 
disguised Portia urges him to do, in the celebrated passage opening with 
 
The quality of mercy is not strained, 
 It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven 
Upon the place beneath. It is twice blest, 
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes. (IV. 1. 181-184) 
 
The complainant is not willing to attend a lecture – by the way, 
the calculated discursive structure of Portia’s speech insinuates a 
prearranged attitude, Portia is there with a mission, the merciful 
conversion of the Jew; Shylock’s recent experience is not favourable to 
such exercises in morals and Christian doctrine, and he had been raised 
up in a hard-boiled school. If the plaintiff does not relent and assumes 
with fervour the literal enforcement of the law and the text of the bond – 
‘My deeds upon my head! I crave the law,/ The penalty and forfeit of my 
bond.’ – and if it is clear and convincing that ‘…There is no power in 
Venice/ Can alter a decree establishèd.’, IV. 1. 215-216), it is then time 
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for an appropriate response bringing to the fore the ultimate effects of an 
obsessive approach. The proceeding will be orchestrated by the talented 
agent provocateur that exposes the clash between the flexibility of the 
spirit and the sterility of the form, suggestively the contrast between the 
Old and the New Law. It is certainly ironic that the argument is 
introduced to a member of a community whose faith and tradition are 
based on textual exegesis and interpretation, as Jean-Loup Rivière 
stresses when introducing the French translation of the play9, let alone 
the fact that the principle ‘an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’ so 
vituperated in the court has historically a sense of moderation and 
control in retaliation, ‘let not evil to hit your enemy exceed evil done to 
yourself’; but what impresses readers and audiences is that the triumph 
of Antonio’s cause is the fruit of the utmost manipulation of formalistic 
devices: only theatre and performance, that is to say, deceit and 
usurpation of identity, pave the way to the providential intervention of 
the astute lawyer. One still keeps in mind that stealing his father’s riches, 
and eloping from Shylock’s house was not embarrasing for Jessica, only 
in her ‘exchange’ was any sense of shame to be found (II. 6.). 
From then on the forensic expert becomes the attorney, acts by 
proxy for the defendant´s sake. He had already insinuated in the open 
pressure on Shylock – ‘Then must the Jew be merciful’, IV. 1. 179 - that a 
fair trial was not in store for the petitioner. A strange cause, indeed, 
promiscuous when joining the voices of interested persons and of 
intruding third parties (above all the impertinent and, in many ways, 
                                                          
9William Shakespeare, Le Marchand de Venise, texte français de Jean-Michel Deprats, Sand, Comédie Française, 
Le Repertoire, 1987, p. 8. 
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infamous Gratiano, or even an involved crowd taking sides for ‘poor 
Antonio’, directions can make much of the scene).The authority of this 
young doctor in law is made conspicuous in the way he goes without the 
judge and addresses directly one of the sides: ‘Tarry a little, there is 
something else.’ (I. 1. 202), he warns peremptorily, before introducing 
the restrictive conditions of the enforcement of the Jew’s prerogative and 
the legal frame of the bond’s execution. An old aphorism states that a bad 
deal may sometimes be preferred to a good verdict, and the composition 
of differences in court is very often the outcome of delicate ponderous 
negotiation, but this case requires an expedient move, ‘To do a great 
right, do a little wrong’ (IV. 1. 213), as Bassanio asks the Duke. The 
defendant surrenders himself to his fate, the complainant refuses to 
accept twice and thrice his money, and horror seizes the court when the 
victorious petitioner sharpens his knife. Sophistry and the imposition of 
unfeasible prerequisites, duly served by the most formalistic legal 
support, will do the job. The apparent solid case had made Shylock go 
both without any exordium, since the judge and the court would not need 
to be ingratiated, and narratio, given the unassailable position of the 
issue: he just reaffirms his case with a hubristic confident confirmatio, as 
Quentin Skinner suggests10.And so Antonio, this way protected by the 
improbable attorney, and Shylock, still self-dealing, and now 
interrogated by what seems the arts of a hostile prosecutor, change 
places in the court design and the nature itself of the cause changes. The 
issue was at first a mere constitutio juridicalis, obvious in its form and 
                                                          
10SKINNER, Quentin, Forensic Shakespeare , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 212-213. 
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meaning, but it becomes a constitutio legalis or legitima, requiring 
interpretation and exegesis11. It is now a penal case and the Jew is the 
culprit when discrimination against outsiders is finally invoked:  
 
It is enacted in the laws of Venice, 
It be proved against an alien 
By direct or indirect attemps 
He seek the life of any citizen, … (IV. 1. 345-348). 
 
The verdict is supposed to acclaim the quality of mercy, that is not 
constrained, in Portia’s speech, but this persuasive intention clashes 
against the parody of forgiveness and good-will: ‘Down therefore, and 
beg mercy of the Duke’ (IV. 1. 360). Wayward path and crooked ways: ‘I 
was never yet more mercenary’, will Portia say later, in a suggestive play 
of ‘mercy’ and ‘mercenary’12. As a matter of fact, the case and 
complainant’s response could have been lead in a very different way:  
 
‘If Shylock had been told at the outset of the criminal liability he faced 
under the statute, he would have torn his bond and left the court. But he did not 
have the guidance of Portia’s voice. Just as Portia entices Bassanio toward the 
correct physical casket of lead, she entices Shylock away from the correct 
rhetorical casket of mercy. We begin to wonder if any choice can be made in 
Portia’s presence that is inconsistent with her will’.13 
 
                                                          
11About this distinction, vide SKINNER, Quentin, ibidem, pp. 54-55. 
12MOODY, A. D. Shakespeare: The Merchant of Venice ,London, Edward Arnold, Sudies in English Literature 21, 
1964, p.12. 
13 YOSHINO, Kenji, A Thousand Times More Fair, What Shakespeare’s Plays Teach Us About Justice, New York, 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2011,P.46 
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And what perhaps ‘muddles the scheme’ of an episode of 
attempted redemption is that it is theologically unsound that the rooted 
nature of a devilish beast of prey may change by any act of conversion. 
Even Jessica, that replicates in a more substantial expression as a 
character traditional partner figures of the old malignant father, like the 
simpleminded Abigail, Baraba’s daughter, of The Jew of Malta, and that 
can only be virtuous by becoming a Christian, would be a difficult case in 
face of doctrine and stereotype, requiring an obstinate exercise in 
emphasizing differences and overcoming resilient cultural 
representations, as Mary Janell Metzger convincingly argues14. Was the 
audience interested in putting in perspective the logic and rigged 
technicalities of such a court? Or in scrutinizing the substantiality of the 
conversion of Shylock? Perhaps not. Assuming that Shakespeare’s 
following the rules of rhetoric by the book was forcibly attached to an 
interpretative exegesis forced upon audiences is not a very convincing 
view, it is perhaps appropriate to take into account the illuminating force 
of historical context and quote David Wotton’s scepticism concerning 
Quentin Skinner ingenious book: 
 
‘It would be helpful here to consider some of the basic principles of the 
English law in Shakespeare’s day. There were as yet no rules of evidence: 
hearsay evidence, for example, was admissible in court. There was no “beyond 
reasonable doubt” test, and indeed no legal presumption on innocent until 
proven guilty. The prosecution was under no obligation to produce witnesses for 
                                                          
14 ‘Now by My Hood, a Gentle and No Jew’: Jessica, The Merchant of Venice , and the Discourse of Early Modern 
English Identity, Publications of the Modern Language Association of America, volume 113, number 1, 1998, 
pp. 52-63. 
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cross-examination: Sir Walter Ralegh was found guilty of treason on the evidence 
of a single witness who was not produced in court. Witnesses for the prosecution 
testified on oath; those for the defense did not. Prisoners had no right to know 
the evidence against them before trial (the key piece of evidence against Ralegh 
was sprung on him during the trial), no right to representation, and no right to 
speak last in their own defence. Trials lasted at most a few hours, often only a 
few minutes. No wonder Ralegh referred what he called “the cruelty of the laws 
of England”15. 
 
Shylock is then not punished for disrespecting the rituals of 
forensic speech and the dignity of the court. That would perhaps exempt 
representation of law and verdict of any suspicious tinge and give some 
substance to the comforting idea that the play is a work of open 
interpretative configuration; and the anti-Jewish parable would find in 
farce a weighty mitigating circumstance. In a way the text is an 
accomplished version of Shakespeare’s dialogic imagination: its fortunes, 
good or bad, display a huge range of contradictory possibilities. The 
tripartite balance that joins the choice of the three caskets, Shylock’s 
three options in court and the three rings (belonging to Nerissa, Portia 
and Shylock), that Kenjy Yoshino sees in the action of the play, tend to 
favour an accepted tradition of folk-lore and to legitimize the exorcism of 
the kill-joy16.However, the face of the hero does not easily merge into the 
abstract construction of a psychological type, it goes, sometimes 
unpredictably, well beyond those reassuring limits. This is the 
                                                          
15WOTTON, David, ‘No Justice, Varied qualities of argument when an intellectual historian turns to 
Shakespeare’, The Times Literary Supplement, December 12, 12 2014, No. 5828, p.4. 
16YOSHINO, Keny, A Thousand Times More Fair, What Shakespeare’s Plays Teach Us About Justice, New York, 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2011, pp. 41-42. 
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predicament of comedy and the dilemma of successful popular 
commercial theatre: nasty boys throw the stones in jest, but frogs die in 
earnest, as the oriental proverb says. And Shylock’s long irregular course 
has made him a central myth in Western culture and imagination, as John 
Gross eloquently illustrates17. Derek Cohen gives voice to this disturbing 
feeling: 
 
´The most troubling aspect of the contradictory element of The Merchant 
of Venice is this: if Shakespeare knew that the Jews were human beings like other 
people – and the conclusion of the play suggests that he did – and if he knew that 
they were not merely carriers of evil but human creatures with human strengths 
and weaknesses, then the play as a whole is a betrayal of the truth. To have used 
it as a means of eliciting feelings of loathing for Jews, while simultaneously 
recognizing that its portrayal of the race it vilifies is inaccurate or, possibly, not 
he whole truth, is profoundly troubling. It is as though The Merchant of Venice is 
an anti-Semitic play written by an author who is not an anti-Semite – but an 
author who has been willing to use cruel stereotypes of that ideology for 
mercenary and artistic purposes’18. 
 
Shades of tragedy haunt this comedy, and this highlights the 
homology established between performance as interpretation and 
jurisprudence as exploration and fixation of meaning. Actors and 
directors struggle for  appropriate or credible significance inscribed in 
words and texts: this is their case law; judges and jurists in their forensic 
                                                          
17Shylock, Four Hundred Years in the Life of a Legend, London, Chatto&Windus, 1992. 
18COHEN, Derek, ‘Shylock and the Idea of the Jew’, in MARCUS, Leah S. , ed. , William Shakespeare, The 
Merchant of Venice, New York and London, W. W.Norton& Company, A Norton Critical Edition, 2006, p. 206.In 
the same way, Arnold Wesker on commenting his choices in Shylock :‘The portrayal of Shylock offends for 
being a lie about the Jewish character. I seek no pound of flesh but, like Shylock, I’m unforgiving of the play’s 
contribution to the world’s astigmatic view and murderous hatred of the Jew’., WESKER, Arnold,The 
Journalists, The Wedding Feast, Shylock, London, Penguin Books, Penguin Plays, 1990, p.179. 
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practice and in legal exegesis, both in the field of the Roman Law and in 
the scope of the Common Law, activate their creative proficiency in the 
search of the law of the case to make sense of the opacity of the rule or 
the vagueness of textual formulation. Extensive application and 
analogical interpretation within the limits and rationale of the law pave 
the way to the overcoming of formalistic drawback. Rhetoric, 
performance, and the pursuit of textual meaning in The Merchant of 
Venice tend, after all, to illustrate the same dialectics of justice and 
mercy. 
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